ORLANDO – A federal judge has decreed that a woman’s litigation against WHG SU and Choice Hotels under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act will proceed, having overcome motions to dismiss and to strike allegations from the complaint.
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida Judge Julie S. Sneed issued a judicial order to that effect on June 12, in Jane Doe K.R.’s lawsuit versus WHG SU Delegates, LLC (WHG SU), Choice Hotels International, Inc. and Choice Hotels International Services Corp.
“According to plaintiff’s complaint, for approximately 12 weeks between March and May 2013, plaintiff was a victim of sex trafficking at the Suburban Extended Stay (Suburban Orlando), a hotel in Orlando, Florida. At all times relevant to the complaint, the Suburban Orlando was owned and operated by WHG SU and was branded by Choice Hotels as the franchisor. Plaintiff alleges that she was forced into human trafficking by an individual named Quantae Veals, who forced plaintiff to have sex with various ‘johns’ for profit at the Suburban Orlando. Plaintiff was 18 years old. According to plaintiff, her sexual exploitation ‘occurred repeatedly in rooms of the Suburban Orlando’ and it was ‘patently obvious’ to the hotel’s staff that she was a victim of human trafficking. Plaintiff alleges that defendants, as the owner and operator and franchisor, were aware that sex trafficking was occurring at the Suburban Orlando because of their monitoring of online reviews of the hotel and surveillance footage and inspections of hotel property, and that ‘traffickers, including [plaintiff’s] trafficker, operated with little regard for concealment due to an implicit understanding between the hotel staff of the Suburban Orlando and the traffickers,” Sneed said.
“According to plaintiff, both she and her trafficker exhibited ‘obvious and apparent signs of trafficking,’ including in interactions with the front desk staff and in the common areas of the hotel and that ‘multiple employees at the Suburban Orlando, including management level employees, observed and/or were made aware of these obvious signs of trafficking while acting within the scope and course of their employment.’ Plaintiff alleges that defendants, as the owner and operator and franchisor of the Suburban Orlando, had the duty and opportunity to stop her trafficking, but instead facilitated it by ignoring the open and obvious signs that she was a victim, continuing to provide rooms and amenities to her traffickers, and taking no steps to stop human trafficking at the Suburban Orlando.”
The suit asserted three causes of action:
• A perpetrator claim against WHG SU pursuant to Sections 1591(a)(1) and 1595(a) of the TVPRA and alleges that WHG SU ‘harbored [plaintiff] by renting a room to [plaintiff’s] trafficker and providing him with services despite knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact’ that she was a victim of human trafficking;
• A claim that defendants are liable as beneficiaries of a human trafficking venture in violation of Section 1595(a) of the TVPRA, in that they ‘received a financial benefit from participating in a venture with traffickers, including [plaintiff’s] traffickers, despite the fact that [defendants] each knew or should have known that these traffickers were engaged in violations of [the TVPRA]’;
• A vicarious liability claim against Choice Hotels under a theory of actual agency for the conduct of WHG SU in facilitating the human trafficking of plaintiff.
In their dismissal motion, Sneed said that “the WHG Su and Choice Hotels defendants argued that the plaintiff is not a victim of human trafficking under the TVPRA, that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the TVPRA’s 10-year statute of limitations, that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim on each cause of action and that the complaint is otherwise an impermissible shotgun pleading.”
“The TVPRA provides a civil cause of action to ‘an individual who is a victim of a violation of’ the TVPRA. Choice Hotels argues that plaintiff has failed to plead that she was a ‘victim’ under the TVPRA because she fails to plausibly allege that her trafficking was due to force, fraud or coercion. The Court disagrees. A ‘victim’ is defined in the TVPRA as ‘the individual harmed as a result of a crime under this chapter.’ For a sex trafficking offense to be committed against an adult under Section 1591, the offense must be ‘effected by means of force, threats of force, fraud or coercion.’ Here, plaintiff alleges that she was ‘drugged and forced into human trafficking’ and ‘under the constant threat of terror…[was] forced and kept…in the bondage of human trafficking by [her trafficker’s] drugging her, physically assaulting her, deviously professing his love for her, and by not allowing her to go anywhere without him.’ Accepting the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, plaintiff has adequately alleged that she was a victim of human trafficking through ‘force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion’ sufficient to bring a cause of action under Section 1595(a),” Sneed stated.
“Defendants each argue that plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed because they are barred by the TVPRA’s statute of limitations. Under the TVPRA, no civil action ‘may be maintained . . . unless it is commenced not later than…10 years after the cause of action arose.’ Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter on May 31, 2023, and defendants therefore argue that any of plaintiff’s claims based on conduct before May 31, 2013 must be dismissed as untimely. Upon consideration, the court disagrees and declines to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on this basis.”
The defendants sought to introduce the criminal docket of a case from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri involving an individual named Quantae Veals, who the defendants argued was the plaintiff’s alleged trafficker and was in police custody as of May 29, 2013. Thus, according to the defendants, none of plaintiff’s alleged trafficking could have occurred prior to the statute of limitations lapsing and her complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.
However, Sneed disagreed with this rationale and declined to dismiss the case based on a statute of limitations-bar argument.
“Here, although plaintiff references Veals in the complaint, the arrest and criminal prosecution of her alleged trafficker is not central to plaintiff’s claims against defendants under the TVPRA, nor is that prosecution a necessary part of plaintiff’s effort to plead those claims. Accordingly, the Court will not consider the criminal docket sheet in addressing defendant’s motions to dismiss. Defendants further argue that because plaintiff filed her complaint on May 31, 2023, any claims arising from conduct that occurred prior to May 31, 2013 are time-barred and must be excluded. Plaintiff argues in response that her claims are not time-barred under the continuing tort doctrine, that her allegations are timely under the discovery rule, and that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled in this case,” Sneed said.
“Based on the facts alleged in the complaint that she was subjected to continued human trafficking at the Suburban Orlando from March to May 2013, a time period that could include acts within the applicable statute of limitations, the court declines to dismiss plaintiff’s claims at this stage. Under the continuing tort doctrine or equitable tolling, plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded facts to survive dismissal at this stage based on defendants’ statute of limitations defense. Moreover, plaintiff is not required to negate an affirmative defense in her complaint. Accordingly, defendants’ motions are denied to the extent they seek dismissal based on the statute of limitations.”
In her order, Sneed also found that the plaintiff properly asserted her additional causes of action and overcame the defendants’ dismissal motions.
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida case 6:23-cv-01012
From the Florida Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com